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Forging Identity
MEXICAN FEDERAL FRONTIER SCHOOLS,

1924-1935

Andrae Marak

P

lutarco Elfas Calles dreamed of forging a single national Mexican identity out of the many cultures that existed at the end of the Mexican
Revolution. His main weapon in the battle for a united Mexico was the
federal primary school, where children could be taught patriotic values and
the proper use of Spanish (especially among the nation's various indigenous
groups). Nowhere were federal primary schools more important than along
the U.S.-Mexico border.
Taking advantage ofthe "voluntary" repatriation of an estimated five hundred thousand Mexicans from the United States during the Great Depression, the federal government set up a series of escuelas {ronterizas (frontier
schools) in the larger cities along the border in January 1930.1 The mission
of these schools was to take Mexicans who were considered suspicious because they had just returned from the United States or had spent their lives
I
along the border, and mold them into patriotic citizens who would be willing to devote themselves to the economic and social advancement of their
mother country.

Andrae Marak is Assistant Professor of History and Political Science at California University
of Pennsylvania. His current research focuses on the assimilation campaign of the Seri and
Tohono 0'odham. Part of the research for this article was supported by a Garcia-Robles Fulbright Dissertation Fellowship and grants from the Latin American and Iberian Institute and
the Graduate School at the University of New Mexico. In addition, suggestions by Linda B.
Hall, Engracia Loyo, Ev Schlatter, Sam Truett, and the New Mexico Historical Review's anonymous reviewers proved invaluable.
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The schools were created to provide an alternative to better funded schools
on the U.S. side of the border, where many Mexican parents sent their children. Frontier schools would teach their children Spanish, Mexican songs
and hymns, and their nation's history rather than English and the Pledge of
Allegiance of the United States. Although most parents were in favor of
increasing funds for border schools and teaching Mexican patriotism, they
also understood the necessity oflearning English to get ahead in the bilingual border economy. Thus, parents pushed the Mexican government to
hire native English-speaking teachers and to mimic the course offerings
of American schools. By threatening to keep their children in U.S. schools
unless these demands were met, Mexican parents partially undermined
the original intent of the federal government and reshaped frontier school
curriculum.
It is my contention that Mexican officials wanted to encourage U.S. economic involvement in the border economy but discourage its citizens from
cultural and social involvement in the burgeoning economy. This article
investigates this contradiction by providing an institutional sketch of the
frontier schools created by the Mexican federal government. I explore the
battle against U.S. cultural and economic imperialism waged by the Mexican government from 1924-1935 in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora and
the resultant struggles over the cultural identity of people living along the
border. First, I consider these struggles through a historical outline of the
American-Mexican frontier and Calles's adoption of frontier schools as a
means of resisting U.S. economic and cultural imperialism. Second, I examine how frontier schools in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora affected
local communities.2 The educational bureaucrats responsible for the schools
in each state adopted specific approaches as a result of the differing cultural
legacies in each region. The personal idiosyncrasies of educational inspectors in charge of overseeing the schools was a significant factor in the role
that the schools played in border culture and economy.
The Creation of the Border

Much like the identities of the people who populated it, the U.S.-Mexican
frontier is a historical construction. The present-day border between the
two countries is the product of over a century and a half of U.S. economic,
cultural, and military imperialism and the subsequent contestation and accommodation among Mexicans, Americans, and their governments. J
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The Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) did not end the efforts of some
prominent U.S. lawmakers to intervene in Mexican territory and sovereignty.
Toward the end of Mexican president Victoriano Huerta's (1913-1914) term
in office, Pres. Woodrow Wilson's special agent, John Lind, suggested that
the United States needed to either militarily intercede in Mexican affairs or
back Huerta's opponents financially. The proposed U.S. military intervention was actually supported by several prominent Mexican politicians, the
most important of whom was Luis Cabrera. 4
Wilson decided to place an embargo on Huerta's regime while lifting
the embargo against his political enemies, the Constitutionalists. When the
United States finally did militarily intervene in the Mexican Revolution by
invading Veracruz in April 1914, the vast majority of Mexicans were understandably opposed to the U.S. interference. 5
Despite the relatively favorable view most Mexican politicians and
policymakers had toward the future role of U.S. capital in the Mexican
economy, the end of the Revolution did not bring respite from those Americans who still saw Mexico as a land that belonged under the auspices of the
United States. For example, American politicians like New Mexico senator
Albert B. Fall advocated heavy involvement in Mexico because of his own
racism. As chairman of the United States Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Mexican Affairs in 1919, Fall suggested that since Mexicans were by nahlfe physically weak and morally base, the United States should intervene in
Mexican affairs-perhaps even waging war if necessary-in order to save
Mexicans from their own decrepitude. 6
Despite the heavy-handed approach that the United States sometimes
took in its dealings with Mexico- before, during, and after the Revolutionmany Mexicans, including the postrevolutionary leaders from the North,
were in favor ofcontinued U.S. investment.? Furthermore, the overall amount
of direct U.S. investment rose during the 1920S as Obregon and Calles were
in the process of reconstructing their shattered nation. s Although Calles
was interested in increasing direct U.S. investment in the Mexican economy,
he was determined that incoming capital benefit Mexicans. Calles argued
that he was "fighting not to destroy capital, but rather so that it might work
according to our laws."9 He and his educational ministers were concerned
that the spread of U.S. capitalism would bring with it the spread of U.S.
culture. Thus, they paid special attention to the forging of proper Mexican
identity among borderland dwellers by inculcating patriotic values through
special frontier schools.
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In late 1929 the Secretaria de Educaci6n Publica (SEP) approved a preliminary budget for the "creation of well organized and equipped border
schools with the object of impeding Mexican children who might go to the
United States to receive their primary education."lo Originally the SEP proposed opening five schools: four along the U.S.-Mexico border in Ciudad
Juarez, Piedras Negras, Nuevo Leon, and Matamoros, and one along the
Mexico-Guatemala border in Motozintla. 1I Their top priority was to stem
the flow of Mexican children going to the United States, consequently, the
frontier school in Motozintla, Chiapas, never actually received funding. 12
In early 1930 SEP officials acknowledged that they had bungled the job
of creating frontier schools by failing to take into account the need to obtain
and repair the school buildings within which the new frontier education
would be offered. SEP informed educational inspectors in charge of implementing frontier school policies that they would have to obtain both the
moral and material support of local and state officials for the new policies in
order to be successfulY
The failure of SEP to secure funding for construction of the schools did
not dampen the ideological importance the ministry placed on the schools.
In 1930 SEP officials reiterated that the frontier schools were an important
tool in constructing a "true nation" out of the heterogeneous cultural milieu of contemporary Mexico. 14 Primary schools, in general, they argued,
were the key to Mexico's future prosperity:
Schools are also necessary, many schools, but primary schools that
study and understand our national life; that instill a love for our
country ... schools whose teaching principally imparts true knowledge
of that which is ours and feels proud of it; [schools] in which the
knowledge of geography, math, history, etc. serves to awaken a love of
nation and promotes an action that benefits the land that saw us born. 15
Despite the clear goals of the new frontier schools and the federal control over
policy-making decisions, the achlal implementation of frontier school policy
would prove to be anything but uniform across the U.S.-Mexico border.

Frontier Education in Coahuila
In January 1930 Ramon Mendez, the head offederal education in Coahuila,
responded to federal directives. He officially requested that a frontier school
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be established in Piedras Negras on the other side of the border from Eagle
Pass, Texas, in order to "give Mexican children the opportunity to receive a
better education and thus counteract the practice of these children going to
the United States's schools."16 The municipal president of Piedras Negras
immediately offered his assistance, promising to give the federal government the city's best existing school for the new project. Mendez readily
accepted and also asked SEP officials in Mexico City for permission to establish a second frontier school in Villa Acuna, across the border from Del
Rio, Texas. Mendez believed, however, that for the frontier schools to be
successful, "it would be very necessary, for example, that the frontier school
have some professors that know and teach English; since [Piedras Negras] is
contiguous with Eagle Pass, many parents want their children to learn the
language and for this reason they send them to the schools of the other
country."l7 Early on, the original aim of policymakers to create patriotic
Mexicans through the frontier schools was und~rmined by the need to adapt
the schools to the conditions and the desires of local inhabitants.
In February, Mendez convinced (or so he thought) the governor of
Coahuila, Nazario S. Ortiz, to pay the 150 pesos monthly rent for the school
building that had been set aside by the municipal president of Piedras Negras.
Mendez reiterated to Ortiz that the school would have to teach English
classes. In addition, he argued that the school would need a kindergarten
and that it would have to offer preparatory classes to prevent students in the
fifth and sixth grades from abandoning "Mexico in search of a high school"
in the United States.
Interestingly, Mendez informed the SEP that the school had yet to open
because it lacked furniture. He did not want to take the furnitur~ from other
nearby schools, thereby crippling already existing schools for the sake of the
frontier school. Ortiz had ordered the local construction of the furniture,
but, in a twist of irony, Mendez noted that he could acquire the furniture
more quickly and cheaply ifhe purchased it in the United States. IS
It appears, however, that the municipal president of Piedras Negras and
the governor of Coahuila were using the promotion of the frontier school to
advance their own personal and political agendas. In January the municipal
president had offered to cede ownership of the city's best existing school to
the federal government for the establishment o(a frontier school. Only a
month later, however, the head of federal education in Coahuila was not
only looking for someone to pay the rent, presumably to the municipal
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president or one of his associates, but was also looking for furniture so that
students could begin to attend the school.
Common sense suggests that the actual building never had been a school
or, at the very least, was no longer functioning as one; otherwise it would
already have had some furniture and supplies. In May, Rafael Castro, the
federal inspector of schools in the border region, complained that the frontier school in Piedras Negras was located in a poor, undersized building for
which the SEP had to pay the governor a monthly rent. The small size of
the school was especially problematic in light of the fact that a large number of federal railroad workers, apparently recently laid off, had settled in
Piedras Negras and their children would need to attend the school.!9 In any
case, the municipal president and the governor rightly viewed the federal
government as a positive investor in the educational advancement of local
citizens and as a client to whom they could rent urban property.20
SEP officials agreed to offer kindergarten and English classes at the frontier school and to fund any other programs that might provide a social service to the local community.2! In response, local educators in Piedras Negras
established a sociocultural center where classes in English, dancing, and
singing were offered for both primary school students and adults. Federal
teachers organized a "tribu de exploradores," based on the model of boy
scouts practiced in Britain and the United States. 22 Teachers were also sent
on a campaign of home visits to teach locals how to live healthier lives and
to convince them to cooperate with the frontier schooJ.23
By June 1930 the sociocultural center was officially open. 24 The school
itself had an enrollment of 113 boys and 98 girls and an actual attendance of
90 boys and 79 girls. 25 It appears, however, that the lure of U.S. schools far
outweighed initial attempts of the federal government to convince Mexicans to attend Mexican schools. The federal inspector of the border region
requested that the head of Piedras Negras's federal secondary school hand
over all the excess school furnit~re and supplies that he had on hand (as a
result of low enrollment and attendance rates) so that they could be used in
the underfunded primary schools in the area. 26
The next two years of the functioning of the frontier school in Piedras
Negras have disappeared from the archival records. The records of educational inspectors dealing with other frontier issues along the u.S.-Coahuila
border, however, are rich. Two of the most prominent border issues facing
education officials during this period were relations with colonos (colonists)
and irrigation workers. In 1931, while visiting the various schools under his
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charge, Federal Inspector of Schools Castro, began exhorting Mexicans who
lived along the border to protect "our nationals that are being deported
from the United States."ll Meanwhile, the Com)si6n Nacional de Irrigaci6n
(National Irrigation Commission) was in the midst of a large project called
the Sistema de Riego No.6 (Irrigation System No.6) along the Rio Bravo.
Local residents, colonos, and irrigation officials would soon be working
at cross-purposes with SEP officials. Most campesinos in the region had
been granted provisional ejidos. In 1931 most of the ejidatarios were notified
that they would be relocated to San Carlos, Coahuila (the previous site of a
hacienda), to make room for newly arriving colonos. 28 Many of these
ejidatarios understandably refused to put forth any further effort to improve
the local federal schools that they would soon be forced to abandon. 29 Some
schools were subsequently shut down as a result. JO
Castro tried to get the federal government to change the status of the
ejidatarios in La Bandera to that of colonos since they had been living there
for their entire lives. When he was successful in doing so, he discovered that
since colonos were not legally bound to cooperate with federal schools in
the same ways that ejidatarios were, the locals still refused to work with him
on educational matters. In response, Castro advocated the adoption of sports
and other "honest diversions" and the expansion of the local anti-alcohol
campaign to eradicate the prominent level of disorder and frequent orgies
that he believed were practiced by both local inhabitants and federal employees working on the irrigation system. J1
In addition to being at odds with the local colonos and the irrigation system workers, Castro had a difficult time convincing irrigation officials to donate the five hectares ofland demanded by law for primary schools. The local
manager of the system continually promised Castro the land, but then refused to turn it over, suggesting that he would again discuss the land with his
superiors. J2 In EI Tepeyac, Castro discovered that many ejidatarios who had
officially been granted lands were renting them or had outright sold them and
were living in nearby Jimenez to take advantage of the cash economy.JJ
In early 1932 federal inspectors tried a new approach to mold the identities of frontier Mexicans. They pushed local communities to purchase radios so that they could listen to the official broadcasts of the Partido Nacional
Revolucionario (PNR) or National Revolutionary Party.J4 Castro complained
that the salary cut he (and the rest of federal employees) received as a result
of the economic depression was hampering his ability to purchase radios for
all of the schools under his charge. J5
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The federal governmenes attempts to promote patriotism along the border, however, may have been undermined by Coahuila's governor, Nazario
S. Ortiz. Governor Ortiz believed that while schools should playa role in
shaping people's attitudes, the state did not have enough resources to waste
valuable school time on festivals, parades, and concerts. Such events, Ortiz
believed, had a "marked character of exhibitionism" and took the place of
real learning. Nonetheless, he was in step with the SEP in advocating sports
leagues, cooperatives, and community-based cajas de ahorro (credit unions)
to mitigate the severity of the Depression. 36
In April Mexico's president, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, decreed that the sale
of liquor within one hundred kilometers of the border would henceforth be
illegal. Castro worked to convince the local inhabitants to become part of
vigilante groups to enforce strict compliance with the new decree. He also
pushed to ensure that every school had a field for baseball so that people
would have something constructive to do during their normal drinking hours.
The enforcement of the anti-alcohol decree had its greatest impact in Villa
Acuna, where a number of cantinas closed. 37 As late as 1934, the campaign
against alcohol consumption and the move to close all cantinas near the
border had still not been successful. Castro noted that there were no drinking establishments located in the vicinity offrontier schools, but that it would
be impossible to close down all the local centers of vice because of their
widespread prevalence. 38 In Mira Villa Castro tried to get the locals to decorate their school and its open air theater so that they would serve as "cultural
propaganda for our federal education system." He also tried to convince
locals to move closer to the school so that their children would find it easier
to attend. 39 Another inspector, Abraham Arellano, noted that the poor construction and lack of furniture in the schools located on the shores of the
Rio Bravo in San Vicente and Boquillas were an embarrassment to Mexico;
he asked municipal authorities to lend a helping hand to the federal
government's project. 40
By 1933 the frontier school in Piedras Negras was in deep trouble as a
result of federal mismanagement. The new head of federal education in
Coahuila, Maurilio P. Nanez, noted that over four days in January there
had been a suspicious and sudden influx of students, likely to secure the
minimum number of 288 students necessary for keeping six teachers and
assistants employed. The director of the school, Carlos Morales Sanchez,
was fired because he lacked the "active, social, nationalist, and democratic
tendencies" necessary to advance the ideology of the Revolution. Federal
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authorities also noted that Sanchez first began offering night classes for adults
at the end of January, probably as a last-ditch effort to save his job. 4!
When the school first opened in 1930, the head of federal education in
Coahuila, Ramon Mendez, boasted that the frontier school would offer night
classes for adults focusing on English, dancing, and singing by the end of
the first semester of the school's existence. It is possible that these classes
only existed on paper at the time, but even if they were implemented, it is
clear that they had a very short life span.
The new director of the frontier school, Eliseo Ruiz Vadillo, attempted
to overcome the school's past difficulties by promoting its work on the local
radio station. He asked the president of the local radio station, XETN, to
regularly air educational lectures, programs, and works undertaken in
school. 42 It was not long, however, before he too ran into difficulties. Two
months after taking over the frontier school, it was discovered that the teacher
who had been put in charge of the local cooperative, Gilberto Ceja Torres,
was embezzling cooperative funds. 43 By the end of April, Vadillo had been
replaced by a new director, Fabian Garda R,44
Garda was quick to make changes. He immediately moved to have Ceja
Torres fired, and then addressed the conditions of the frontier school. He
noted that the majority of the.adults who had been recruited to attend night
classes had already passed the sixth grade. Thus, it would be necessary to
hire teachers to give instruction in typewriting, singing, and choir. Finally,
Garda observed that the school had recently received baseball equipment
from the PNR, and he promised to put the equipment to good use. 45
In January 1933 the SEP pushed for the advancement of frontier schooling by arranging for two additional frontier schools, one in Villa Acuna and
the other in Piedras Negras. The minister of education, Narciso Bassols
(1931-1934), notified Coahuila's governor that he would be turning one of
the federal primary schools in Villa Acuna into a frontier school. 46 The new
school would be staffed by 6 federal teachers, 3 municipal assistants, and
would be capable of instructing 350 primary studentsY The SEP figured
that setting up a frontier school in Villa Acuna (after having been unable to
find the resources in the past) was especially important because municipal
authorities in Del Rfo, Texas, had established several schools specifically
aimed at assimilating Mexican children into U.S. culture. 48 After making
the basic arrangements for the frontier school in Villa Acuna, the SEP turned
over its management to the state of Coahuila. 49 By January 1934, work on
the Villa Acuna school stopped due to'lack of funds. School officials hoped
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to secure additional funds from the state government to add fifth and sixth
grade classrooms and the necessary additional teachers to staff them. 50
At the end of 1934, the new federal inspector in the area, Micaela Zuniga
R, found it necessary to organize a fundraiser for the state-run frontier school
in Villa Acuna. Even in late 1934, the school still lacked proper lighting and
water, and municipal authorities had almost completely neglected the
schooPI The problem of funding was compounded by the fact that locally
supported private schools lured students away from frontier schools that
advanced the anti-religious tenets of socialist education promoted by the
minister of education, Narciso Bassols.
Local citizens pulled their children from federal schools and placed them
in clandestine private schools where they were given religious instruction.
Even the closure of seven of these private schools had failed to increase
attendance at federal schools. Zuniga tried to convince the inhabitants of
Villa Acuna to send their children back to federal schools (and in the process keep parents out oflocal cantinas) by offering increased sporting events
and classes in sewing and knitting. Despite all their efforts, both the federal
school and Villa Acuna itself remained in "terrible conditions."52
Early in 1933, the second frontier school in Piedras Negras opened its
doors. The school initially lacked electricity and was thus limited to offering
only day classes. The school's first director, Carlos Flores Fortis, had problems getting along with the student body. He asked for a two-month leave of
absence, and was subsequently replaced.'3 By March the new director, Mario
Matus Micelli, had opened a school store to sell products produced during
classes. Micelli arranged for electricity at the school and night classes, which
focused on sewing and small industries, were held regularly, and enrolled
eighty women. 54
When school officials tried to offer night classes in basic reading and
writing in April 1933, only ten people were present. When they expanded
the number of classes to include domestic economy, Spanish, math, speech,
cultural aesthetics, and singing, an additional 128 people participated (88 of
them women).55 Night classes on basic reading and writing were the bread
and butter of rural primary schools in Mexico during this period.
The fact that reading and writing classes proved highly unsuccessful,
and that they were replaced by other classes that found a greater general
interest among locals suggests two things: differing needs between rural and
urban dwellers, and a willingness on the behalf of SEP officials to adjust to
parental pressure and desires in order to make an impact in the local com-
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munity. Nonetheless, even urban schools still advanced Calles's belief that
agriculture would be the engine of future Mexican prosperity. In accordance with agricultural ideals, educational inspectors were forced to find
suitable agricultural lands, often far from the actual location ofurban schools,
for students to learn modern farming techniques, even if they would never
put them to use. 56
At the behest of Rafael Castro, municipal officials in Piedras Negras implemented a 2 percent custom's fee to pay for the construction of a local high
school to provide a Mexican alternative for city residents and as an improvement over the frontier schools. By January of 1934, however, the fee was
dropped due to the dismissal of the municipal president, the administrator
of customs, and the head of the local post office when President Lazaro
Carden,as assumed office in Mexico City. In place of the custom's fee, the
new municipal president offered to donate ten pesos toward the purchase of
cultivable land needed by the frontier schools. 57
By late 1934, the implementation of socialist education practices that
purported to counter subversive religious propaganda inhibiting Mexico's
economic and social progress were in full swing. 58 In early 1935 federal teachers were active in the local community and helped local brickmakers form
a union that pressed for and received a 1. 5 pesos daily wage. Despite these
advances, the frontier schools still did not have regular English, music, or
typewriting teachers, and attendance was suffering. 59
When the 1934-1935 school year ended, Castro informed his superiors
that if Mexico really wanted to compete against the education being offered
in the United States, Mexico would have to take some dramatic steps. Castro
estimated that to compete with the United States, five new schools, each
staffed with six regular teachers and two additional teachers to give instruction in English and other special courses, must be opened. He anticipated
that these schools would cost up to 400,000 pesos to put into place and an
additional 1,500 pesos per month to run effectively. Castro argued that the
frontier schools located in Piedras Negras and Villa Acuna educated only 10
percent and

20

percent respectively of school-aged children in their local

communities. The children not attending the frontier schools either attended
private schools (where many of them were being illegally instructed on religious matters) or crossed the border to go to U.S. schools fiO Boosting attendance numbers at the frontier schools, Castro realized, would be a difficult
task. Teachers in the United States were earning about h5 per month, more
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than Mexico's inspector generals. In addition, the United States was running well-funded schools specifically aimed at assimilating Mexican children into U.S. society. Finally, many of the children that did attend Mexican
primary schools were forced to go to the United States if they wanted to
attend secondary or high school.
Despite evidence to the contrary, Castro did not believe that rural Mexicans were going to the United States because of better schools; he did not
deny, however, that many urban Mexicans were certainly drawn in by U.S.
schools. Castro's final solution (in addition to the funding of the additional
five border schools that he had proposed) was the "absolute suppression of
all non-federal schools" to ensure that all Mexican schools were delivering
high quality education that could compete with education on the U.S. side
of the border. 6!

Frontier Education in Chihuahua
From the point of view of federal educators, by late 1929 the situation along
the Chihuahuan section of the U.S.-Mexican border was dire. At the center
of the problem was Ciudad Juarez. The border city was the most important
link between the United States and Mexico and was the location of Mexico's
most important customhouse. 62
Ciudad Juarez had a darker side as well; it served as a center for smuggling, gambling, prostitution, and contraband. 6J By 1870 the region had already been the center of a "highly organized" cattle rustling business. 64
During the Mexican Revolution, Ciudad Juarez served as a center for weapons smuggling by the various military factions vying for national power. With
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) in the United States
on 29 January 1919, the city became the center of a newly flourishing bootlegging and contraband business. 65 By 1929 the main commerce undertaken
by Ciudad Juarez's 21,000 inhabitants was distilling alcohol destined to be
smuggled north across the border. The city boasted one beer factory and
two whiskey distilleries. Residents also engaged in running gambling houses.
While state officials gave lip service to fighting the spread of these industries, the reality was that by 1931, gambling provided the state with over 70
percent of its overall tax revenue, and taking concrete action against gambling would be political suicide. 66 A further problem, according to education officials, was that between 50,000 and 55,000 of El Paso's 108,000
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inhabitants were MexicanY In the eyes of SEP policymakers, this meant
that 50,000 to 55,000 people were in the process oflosing their culture.
The advancement of frontier schooling in Ciudad Juarez proved to be
ironic in that while the federal government used education to stamp out the
vices associated with the border for moral and cultural reasons, it simultaneously undermined those very policies by supporting the expansion ofgambling and bootlegging for economic and political reasons. Chihuahua
governor Rodrigo Quevedo (1932-1936) based his political power on his ruthlessness, his control oflarge revenue sources based on border gambling and
bootlegging, and on support from Plutarco Elfas Calles.68 Calles used his
close political ties with Quevedo to convince the governor to turn control of
Chihuahua's state primary school system over to the federal government. In
return, Calles did not interfere in Quevedo's illegal border activities. The
state's education director, Salvador Varela, and one of the inspectors assigned to the area, Ramon Espinosa Villanueva, realized that they had nowhere to turn for help in combating contraband trade because state and
local authorities were actively taking part in the illegal activities. 69
The illicit activities of some Chihuahuans, however, benefited the frontier schools. Quevedo's chief competitor in the gambling and bootlegging
industry in Ciudad Juarez, Enrique Fernandez, was donating his monetary
and moral support to local federal schools. Fernandez was commended on
several occasions for donating land, buildings, and supplies to schools located along the border and, in the process, secured the good graces of the
local education inspector. 7o Many of the families (the majority, according to
the local inspector) that made use of the schools donated by Fernandez
were probably employed in the contraband trade. Almost comically, at the
same time that Fernandez was cultivating his relationship with local educators, the education inspector, J. Reyes Pimentel, was waging an anti-alcohol
campaign aimed at reducing the number of people involved in running
alcohol across the border.
Pimentel complained to his superiors that the contraband trade made
his job of improving education along the border doubly difficult. Many
families involved in the business outright refused to cooperate with the.
schools, and even those families that were inclined to cooperate with school
authorities lived scattered about the countryside surrounding Ciudad Juarez.
Living outside the city facilitated Chihuahuans slipping across the border
unseen at night. 71 Pimentel's hard work paid off, and by 1935 the education
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inspector was convinced that the school's social campaigns and advancement of sports, especially baseball, had undermined the propensity of frontier dwellers to work in the alcohol industry.72 The repeal of US. Prohibition
in 1933 and the assassination of Fernandez (after one earlier unsuccessful
attempt), however, were probably the overriding causes of the industry's
diminution. 73
While the SEP's response to the contraband liquor business played an
important role in inhibiting the advancement offrontier schooling in Ciudad
Juarez, general apathy and the enticement of better schools on the US. side
of the border were also problems. When the head of federal education in
Chihuahua, Salvador Varela, first advanced the idea of increased funding
for frontier schooling in November 1929, he was confronted with a situation
in which about 25 percent (1,000 of an estimated 4,200) of the children of
Ciudad Juarez were crossing the border to attend school in EI Paso, Texas.
Even the children currently attending primary school in Ciudad Juarez were
likely to go to EI Paso for industrial, vocational, or English classes after they
had graduated.
Furthermore, when school inspector Pimentel attempted to involve
Mexican parents residing in EI Paso in festivities celebrating the anniversary of the Mexican Revolution, they protested vociferously and refused to
take part. His attempts to promote increased respect for the Mexican flag
and prohibit the use of foreign (i.e., English) words met with a tepid response. Instead, parents told him that they would consider keeping their
children in Mexican scho<?Is if the Mexican government could guarantee
the establishment of fourth and fifth grade classes in Ciudad Juarez.74
In response to the local difficulties, Varela suggested that a former convent that had just been taken over by the federal government be set aside as
the future site for a frontier schooJ.75 In addition, he argued that the teachers
hired to staff the new frontier school would have to be from the interior of
Mexico because the existing teachers along the border were neither Mexican nor American. 76 In January 1930, the one existing federal primary school
in Ciudad Juarez closed in order to make room for a new and improved
frontier school.
Like its counterpart in Piedras Negras, the frontier school in Ciudad
Juarez encountered problems. First, when the federal government adopted
a socialist pedagogy, parents complained that they were not "in agreement
with the new direction" that the school was taking and insisted that a number of radical teachers be dismissed. Parents threatened to pull their chil-
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dren out of the frontier school and send them to school in EI Paso if radical
.' teachers were not fired. 77 Second, by 1932 the SEP was in the midst of a
court battle with the ex-convent's former owner, Senorita Mariana Ochoa,
over ownership of the school building.78 Ochoa had designated the building
as a school for the poor, but SEP officials were positive that she was actually
using it as a clandestine "Catholic convent" for religious teaching. The
Constitution of 1917 made religious teaching in schools illegal, and SEP
officials began to earnestly enforce the anti-religious measures of the constitution in 1926. In early 1933, the Circuit Court in Monterrey made a finding
in favor of Ochoa, forcing the SEP to appeal the decision to Mexico's Supreme Court onthe basis that it had already spent twenty thousand pesos to
improve the building. The SEP was finally given ownership of the former
convent in August 1933.79
While the battle for ownership of the school raged, parents raised 5,800
pesos to buy sewing machines, a radio, a film projector, and an industrial
department. 8o Despite the apparent support for the school, parents complained that the school itself was located in Ciudad Juarez's tolerance zone,
near the international bridge leading to EI Paso. They argued that their
children were going to school in the same neighborhood where local authorities promoted prostitution and sadistic public acts-prostitutes performed sex acts with burros and had anal sex in public-in order to attract
U.S. tourists. 8l
The third problem encountered by the Ciudad Juarez school was parents' complaints that many of the teachers lacked a proper education and
spent their spare time getting drunk in local cantinas. Once again, parents
insisted that if the SEP did not promptly address these issues, they would
pull their children from the frontier school and send them to EI Paso. The
SEP responded with an investigation that turned up no concrete faults on
the part of the teachers assigned to the school. 82
A final issue plaguing the frontier school was that of sex education. In
early 1934, a number of parents disturbed by the idea of sex education being
advanced by the SEP in Ciudad Juarez voiced their concern. To overcome
the parental objections, SEP officials distributed copies of the textbooks
being used. They focused particular attention on the various feminine leagues
that had organized against sex education near the border. 83 A number of
teachers assigned to the frontier school refused to sign a written statement
that acknowledged their support of socialist education. Ramon Espinosa
Villanueva thought that it was due to the influence of the high number of
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Catholic priests who had crossed the border into El Paso to establish private
religious schools. These same priests, he believed, were behind the demonstrations against sexual (or as the priests called it, "sensual") education. Thus,
he asked each of the teachers who had refused to support socialist schooling
to renounce their religious beliefs. The teachers refused. The school inspector then initiated a petition campaign with the support of La Unidad
Magisterial (The Magisterial Unity), the Bloque Radical de Maestros
Socialistas de Ciudad Juarez (The Radical Block of Socialist Teachers of
Ciudad Juarez), and the Federaci6n de Sociedades de Padres de Family (The
Federation of Parent Societies) to push for the dismissal of the teachers. 84
In 1935 Espinosa Villanueva asked the SEP for the necessary funding to
establish two additional schools in Ciudad Juarez so that Mexican youth
would no longer cross the border and be inculcated with "sentiments contrary to the interests of Mexico."85 A previous trip to El Paso by SEP officials
had revealed that the special U.S. school established to assimilate Mexican
children into American culture stressed that the United States was the greatest
country in the world and had the most powerful Navy. The SEP officials
noted that the Mexican children attending the school-z,oz4 in total, onethird of whom were from Ciudad Juarez-were losing their Spanish language skills by speaking and writing mostly English. 86
By 1935 SEP officials were beginning to realize that the frontier schools
were not doing the job that they had been created to do. In May Celso
Flores Zamora, the head of the Department of Rural Schools, argued that
"the rural frontier and primary schools that are presently functioning, until
now have not formed the barrier that could impede the passage of our children to the neighboring country in which they look for a betterment that in
their own country they can not find."87 Espinosa Villanueva believed that
the solution lay in hiring only male teachers and increasing funding to frontier schools. 88 Another inspector, Jesus Coello, thought that a pro-Spanish
campaign where locals were encouraged to take part in festivals and sing
songs about the evils of capitalism and religion was the answer. 89 But the
problem was much deeper than that. The struggle between religious and
socialist teachers was a factor that constantly undermined the delivery of
education within the frontier school. Numerous unions called for the forced
expulsion of all teachers who refused to denounce their religious views;
some teachers feared persecution if they did not join their local socialist
teacher's union. 9lI While SEP officials attributed the struggle between religious and socialist education to the proximity of the border, the truth was
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that the border gave religious parents the opportunity to send their children
to El Paso to receive a private religious education that was much more to
their liking.
.
Perhaps even more damaging to the frontier schools in Chihuahua than
the schism between religious and socialist teachers was the discovery that
Ramon Espinosa Villanueva and the director of the frontier school in Ciudad
Juarez, Jose Medrano, had been regularly sending false and misleading reports to the SEP. The SEP dispatched its inspector general, Alfonso G. Alanis,
to address parental complaints and found that Medrano attended school
irregularly, made personal use of school supplies and resources, hired and
fired teachers based on his personal whims (even though the majority of
them were unionized), was a local politician of Communist affiliation, and
did not offer night classes as legally required. 91
Despite such misconduct, Espinosa Villanueva kept his job. He hoped
to reverse the practice of hiring only teachers from Mexico's interior, a practice established by his predecessor, Salvador Varela. Espinosa Villanueva
argued that teachers who were not from the border region could not adapt
to frontier life and, thus, should not be hired. Neatly ignoring the major
conflicts created by the advancement of the SEP's socialist and antireligious pedagogy, he proposed to eliminate fighting among teachers by
advocating equal pay for all teachers. 92 Finally, he encouraged improving
Ciudad Juarez's secondary school so that Mexicans would not be forced to
send their children to "gringo universities" where they only learned to think
about "the land of [George] Washington."93 In 1936 the SEP showed continued support of frontier schooling by opening a second frontier school in
Ciudad Juarez and another in Ojinaga.

Frontier Schooling in Sonora
Frontier schooling was much less contentious and confrontational in Sonora
than in either Coahuila or Chihuahua. Nogales, the site of Sonora's frontier
school located across the border from its sister city of the same name in
Arizona, had originally been a small outpost established by railroad workers. 94 The economic growth of Ambos Nogales (both Nogales) evolved in
such a manner that the two cities were actually one economically interdependent town "separated ·only by a street."95 Relations between Mexicans
and Americans were enhanced by the fact that many U.S. residents in
Nogales learned Spanish while their Mexican counterparts learned English
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to enhance their business prospects. By the time of the Mexican Revolution, the inhabitants of Sonora were known as the "Yankees of Mexico"
because of their close ties to the United States. 96
In 1928 a primary school for 200 children was set up in Nogales, Mexico,
in a vacant building donated (along with 108 double-sided desks) to the
SEP by state authorities. 97 The school was located on Avenida Alvaro Obregon
and was housed in a five-story building that was, according to the school's
director, Rosalfo E. Moreno, poorly ventilated and poorly lit. 98 In addition
to the regular curriculum, school officials focused on teaching the children
how to safely cross the city's busy streets. 99 The school's success was hampered, however, by poor attendance as a result of parents' decisions to pull
their children from school on both Mexican and U.S. holidays.
Throughout 1929 Moreno concerned himself with the welfare of the
children in the school, trying to convince the families of older children to
leave their children in school rather than send them across the border in
search of work. 100 In February of that year, a child came down with meningitis and the school was subsequently closed. Those who had come into contact with the child were isolated. 101 Illness was not the school's only problem.
The Depression forced the federal government to pay teachers only half of
their regular salary. In March three border school teachers with newly reduced salaries crossed the border to look for work in Arizona. lOz The school's
director told federal officials that the newly reduced salaries were not "sufficient for [life's] most necessary expenses. I believe that we will not continue
working much longer."I03 He then quit.
The school's new director for the 1929-1930 school year, Alfonso Acosta
v., was entrusted with the job of transforming the school from a regular
primary into a frontier primary school. He held a meeting in May 1930 with
local parents to figure out how they could compete with the "Yankee schools"
in Arizona and how best to reach all of the Mexican children who were
presently attending school there. Acosta V. figured that 75 percent of all the
children in the Nogales, Arizona, school district were Mexican citizens. 104
There is little indication, however, that the change from a regular primary
school to a frontier school was anything other than nominal.
The 1931-1932 school year brought with it another new director, Agapito
Constantino, who implemented policies that likely pushed additional Mexican parents to send their children to school in Arizona. For example,
Constantino believed that it was necessary to shame the students who attended his school into changing their behavior. He did so by scheduling a
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public assembly at the beginning of every school day in which children
were divided into different groups and forced to stand underneath banners
corresponding to their perceived level of punctuality and c1eanliness. lO;
Another issue that forced Mexican families to send their children to the
United States for schooling was the deplorable condition of Nogales's only
secondary school. In 1932 the secondary school shared a building with a
local primary school. The twenty-six primary school students who graduated in 1931, many of whom would immediately enter the job market, were
so few in number that attracting enough students to keep the secondary
school functioning properly was nearly impossible.106 Nonetheless, the secondary school was moved to a new location near the frontier primary school
on Avenida Alvaro Obregon and placed under the authority of a new director, Angel Alfonso Andrade, who, according to SEP officials, "rescued the
school from the toilet."I07 By 1933 the secondary school was deemed to be
functioning perfectly, and by 1934 school officials noted that it was being
actively supported by influential members of Ambos Nogales. lOs
The truth is that frontier schooling was not a high priority for Sonoran
officials. First, parents in Ambos Nogales seemed inclined to continue supporting the practice of sending the majority of Mexican children across the
border to Arizona for their primary and secondary schooling. Second,
Plutarco Elias Calles's son and the state's governor, ~odolfo Elias Calles
(1931-1934) thought that rather than expanding the school system along the
border, the best way to improve the situation of Mexicans repatriated during the Depression was to place them in colonies. The colonies were set up
by the state on former lands of the Mayo and Yaqui Indians in southern
Sonora. I09 Third, and most importantly, Calles's main preoccupation in the
educational field was his role in implementing the government's widespread
defanaticization campaign, which began in 1931 and was aimed at removing, once and for all, the influence of the church in Sonora,u°

Conclusion
Plutarco Elias Calles and his education ministers wanted somehow to encourage U.S. economic involvement in the U.S.-Mexico border region while
at the same time discouraging Mexican citizens from cultural and social
involvement in the burgeoning economy. Frontier schools were the means
by which they hoped to stem U.S. cultural imperialism. They failed to do
so. Mismanagement, better course offerings, better opportunities to learn
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English, better facilities on the U.S. side of the border, and access to religious education in the United States each played a role in the failure of the
Mexican frontier schools.
This article has provided a preliminary institutional history of Mexican
frontier schools, highlighting the ways in which different local, political,
and social environments led to very different conceptions of the roles of
frontier schools. Despite a long history of hostility between Coahuila and
Chihuahua and Texas, SEP officials were unable to stem the flow of Mexican children to primary schools in the United States. The frontier schools
in both Mexican states were plagued by mismanagement, political struggles
between different factions of teachers, and the drive to eliminate religious
teaching from federal schools. Nonetheless, inspectors soon realized that
they could increase enrollment by providing English and vocational classes
and by lessening the emphasis on festivals, parades, and concerts meant to
develop a sense of patriotism. In Sonora, where there was a spirit of cooperation between leading members of Ambos Nogales, federal education officials never officially advocated the creation of a frontier school and local
officials (who decided to push the issue anyway) actually worked to gain the
support of community members on both sides of the border. Thus, they
never tried to stem the flow of Mexican children to U.S. schools. In order to
gain a better understanding of the effects that frontier schools had on Mexican citizens living near the border in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora,
future historians will need to move beyond broad comparisons at the state
level and delve into the microhistories of each of the locations where frontier schools were founded.
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